Resource Parity for Defense Counsel and the
Struggle Between Public Choice and Public Ideals
by Ronald F. Wright*

INTRODUCTION – THE CURRENT MESS, AND A WAY OUT
Lawyers hate to admit it, but criminal defendants do get what they pay
for; or more precisely for most defendants, they get what the government
pays for. Buyers of legal services who pay more will, on average and in the
long run, receive more than those who pay less. Although there are genuine
debates about the most efficient ways to organize criminal defense work,1
money can improve any chosen method of delivering defense services. The
laws of supply and demand are not suspended within the walls of the
criminal courthouse.
Money not only matters; it now overshadows constitutional doctrine
when it comes to improving the quality of criminal defense. Forty years ago,
Gideon v. Wainwright2 put defense counsel into more cases, holding that the
state was obliged to provide counsel for all indigent felony defendants.
Twenty years ago, Strickland v. Washington3 declared that the constitution
ensures some minimum level of quality in defense work, establishing the
*
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See Bob Sablatura, Study Confirms Money Counts in County’s Courts: Those Using
Appointed Lawyers Are Twice as Likely to Serve Time, HOUS. CHRON, Oct. 17, 1999, at 1
(privately retained attorneys obtain lower conviction rates and lower sentences that publiclyfunded attorneys representing clients facing comparable charges); but cf. ROGER A. HANSON,
et al., INDIGENT DEFENDERS GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL (1992) (publicly funded
attorneys in nine jurisdictions process cases as quickly as private attorneys and obtain
comparable sentences). There are certainly settings when a state spending less can
nevertheless obtain defense work of equal quality to a state spending more, because of more
efficient organization. For instance, there are some economies of scale in moving from an
appointed counsel to a public defender model. See Matthew Dolan, New Study Makes Case
for Public Defenders, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Dec. 19, 2001.
2
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3
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legal standard for determining when counsel has provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance that invalidates a conviction. But those basic
constitutional guarantees have produced little improvement in defense
lawyering in the average case. Year after year, in study after study,
observers find remarkably poor defense lawyering that remains unchanged
by this constitutional doctrine, and point to lack of funding as the major
obstacle to quality defense lawyering.4 The power of money, rather than
constitutional standards of quality, will drive any large-scale changes for
indigent defense in the future.
For anyone who sees how legislatures fund defense counsel for the
indigent, this is a dispiriting claim. Indigent defense remains on a starvation
diet in most jurisdictions in the United States. Although state and local
governments periodically revisit the question and reluctantly decide to
increase funding, it is more common for them to search for methods to
“control the costs” of indigent defense. In normal economic conditions of
modest inflation, and with normal (for our generation) annual increases in
arrests, charges, and convictions, a frozen budget for indigent defense
begins to run short after only a few years. Thus, those who seek adequate
funding for indigent defense must return to the legislature year after year,
and they hear No far more often than they hear Yes.
One way out of this predicament would make some of the choices on
funding for defense counsel automatic, so the increases necessary to stay at
current support levels in real dollars would happen without any special
legislative attention, along the lines of “cost of living” adjustments for
Social Security benefits. This article explores one such automatic device, the
idea of “parity” between funding for defense counsel and the prosecution. If
legislators were obliged to give roughly equal resources to the prosecution
and the defense, then every salary increase or new personnel funding for the
more popular prosecutors would lead mechanically to some comparable
increase in defense funding.
Parity of resources is not the current reality in criminal justice funding.
Prosecutors tend to draw larger salaries than publicly-funded defense
attorneys. They have lower individual caseloads than full-time public
4
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lawyers at wages and benefits equal to what is spent on the prosecution”); Richard Klein, The
Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986) (describing how poor funding
weakens Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance).
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defenders and greater access to staff investigators, expert witnesses, and
other resources. What could shift our current practice in the direction of
resource parity?
The parity concept could become the centerpiece of constitutional
standards announced and enforced by judges interpreting the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.5 Professor Donald Dripps has argued that the
ex post standards for measuring performance of defense counsel under
Strickland should be supplemented by ex ante standards, allowing the
criminal defendant to file a pretrial motion to block the proceedings if the
defense does not have rough parity with the prosecutor in terms of
credentials, compensation, and caseload. Resource parity for the defense is
not currently required under the federal or state constitutions,6 but glimmers
of the parity concept have appeared in a few judicial opinions.7
To depend on judges alone to spread this idea, however, is folly.
Judicial rulings can play some role, but their reach will remain tentative and
their staying power weak. In the long run, legislatures themselves must
embrace parity if it is to become a meaningful part of their funding habits.
Why not champion the parity concept directly to the legislature rather than
relying entirely on the clumsy and remote means of judicial rulings to
deliver the message?
The short answer to the question lies in public choice theory.
According to this application of microeconomic principles to government
actors, legislators act rationally to maximize their personal utility – that is,
they vote in ways that will assure their own re-election.8 When it comes to
legislation that could help criminal defendants, there is not much utility to
maximize, because government efforts to prevent wrongful convictions and
unduly harsh penalties appeal to a politically weak constituency – young

5
See DONALD DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE 179 (2003); Donald A. Dripps,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case For An Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 242 (1997); see also William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 70 (1997).
6
For instance, cases such as United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (rejecting
presumption of ineffectiveness when inexperienced attorney was appointed shortly before
complex criminal case), make it clear that constitutionally “adequacy” can fall short of
providing an ideal challenge to the prosecution.
7
See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990) (setting appointed attorney
compensation in light of salary paid to prosecutors with comparable experience).
8
See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962); DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
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black males living in poverty, for the most part.9 Public choice theory, then,
suggests that there is no hope for legislation to establish ongoing and
automatic parity between prosecution and defense resources.
But this pessimistic account from public choice theory, although it casts
some useful light on legislative behavior, is too crude a tool to explain all
criminal justice legislation.10 Every so often, legislatures vote for measures
that incidentally benefit criminal defendants. They do so when the debate
becomes framed in terms of competitive balance or integrity of an entire
system. When a proposed law taps into public ideals of fair treatment for
public employees or reliability of the court system, legislators might vote for
it despite the fact that the law happens to help criminal defendants. All is not
lost for the parity principle in the legislature, after all.
In this article, I explore the viability of resource parity for indigent
defense as a legislative concept. I conclude that resource parity, under the
right conditions, could take hold as a funding principle in the legislative
branch. This conclusion grows out of a theoretical exercise, an effort to
specify the conditions that can allow a legislature to enact laws that benefit
criminal defendants, even though such statutes are counterintuitive under
public choice theory. But the conclusion also grows out of experience –
there are state and local jurisdictions in the United States that have already
embraced some version of resource parity.
Part I of this article considers the abstract case for resource parity, and
how such a funding principle meshes with the history and rhetoric of the
adversarial criminal justice system in the United States. Part II moves from
rhetoric to practice, by describing recent experience with various forms of
resource parity. In a handful of jurisdictions scattered around the country,
state legislatures and local governments have committed themselves to
salaryparity: attorneys who work for district attorneys and for public
defenders are paid on the same salary scale. And in at least a few
jurisdictions, legislatures have begun to think in terms of broader resource
parity, passing statutes and budgets that link overall resources for indigent
defense to the resources for prosecution. These laws tackle the more
difficult job of measuring the parity of caseloads between prosecution and
9

See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give A Damn About the Rights of the Accused? 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993).
10
See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); cf. Dan Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and
Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1513 (2002).
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defense, and the parity of support services such as access to investigators
and expert witnesses.
Part III reviews recent litigation intended to improve the funding for
indigent defense. The litigation has not yet transformed the face of criminal
defense funding around the country, but it is starting to create a pressure
point. Unfortunately, the litigation has concentrated on parity among
defense lawyers in different jurisdictions rather than parity between
defenders and prosecutors. This posture makes it difficult for judges to
change funding practices in more than a few extremely under-funded
jurisdictions. Further, most of the gains in litigation could disappear in only
a few years if not reinforced with changes in legislative habits.
Part IV contrasts the first steps toward parity in the legislative branch
with the less promising signs from the judicial branch. It explores the
conditions, theoretically speaking, that might lead a legislative body to
adopt a principle of parity to guide its funding choices for indigent defense.
And in Part V, I discuss how interaction between the judicial and legislative
efforts can favor the parity principle, with the limited judicial successes
becoming a leverage point for legislative successes. This dynamic works
remarkably well in other contexts such as prison funding, and might also
work here.

I.

PARITY AND THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARIAL
PROCESS

Resource parity builds on a venerable idea: the defense function is just
as important to society as the prosecutorial function. This proposition has
deep roots in both the historical practices and the rhetoric of AngloAmerican criminal justice.
Criminal justice in England and the United States was not always
adversarial, and lawyers did not always dominate the proceedings. But as
professional public prosecutors became involved in wider categories of
cases over time, defense attorneys followed in their wake. Wherever
government attorneys controlled the charging and prosecution of crime,
criminal defense lawyers became available to a wider range of defendants.
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Before the end of the seventeenth century, English law did not allow
felony defendants to rely on counsel at trial.11 Defendants presented their
own evidence and cross-examined any accusing witnesses themselves.12
Technically, the government could employ a prosecuting attorney at this
time, even though the defendant could not use an attorney at trial. In
ordinary criminal cases, however, the Crown did not actually employ
prosecuting attorneys. The victim of the alleged crime presented the facts of
the case, and in a few cases the victim retained a private attorney to make
any necessary legal arguments. But by and large, the accuser and the
defendant developed the facts, with active involvement from the judge and
with no lawyers on the scene at all.13
The legal bar on defense counsel participation at trial began to break
down precisely in those settings where professional prosecutors appeared
more often.14 According to John Langbein, a “steady trickle” of prosecuting
attorneys began to appear for the Crown in ordinary criminal cases by the
1730s, and at that same point judges allowed defense counsel to participate
in some cases, probably in an effort to equalize the prosecution and
defense.15 By the 1780s, prosecuting attorneys became the norm in serious
11
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 355 (1765-1769); 2
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 39, § 2, at 400 (1721).
Defense lawyers were allowed earlier in misdemeanor cases, where the distinction between
civil and criminal proceedings was less clear (for instance, in trespass or nuisance cases).
12
Indeed, defendants were even discouraged from consulting attorneys before the trial. See
Fitzharris, 8 ST. TR. 243, 332 (1681) (accused ordered to give notes of his conversation with
attorney to his wife); College, 8 ST. TR. 549, 585 (1681) (notes given to King’s counsel).
13
See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
307-314 (1978); David Philips, Good to Associate and Bad Men to Conspire: Associations
for the Prosecution of Felons in England, 1760-1860, in POLICING AND PROSECUTION IN
BRITAIN 1750-1850,at 113 (Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder eds., 1989).
14
During the Civil War era of the late seventeenth century, the Crown used prosecuting
attorneys in many treason trials; thus, the Treason Act of 1696 made these trials the first
where a defendant could present his case through an attorney. The statute declared that
treason defendants should be allowed “just and equal means for defense of their
innocencies….” 7 & 8 Wil. 3, c. 3, § 1 (1696) (emphasis added); HAWKINS, supra note 11,at
402 (defense counsel justified in treason cases because they “are generally managed for the
Crown with greater Skill and Zeal than ordinary prosecutions”).
15
John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-incrimination at
Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1994); John H. Langbein, Shaping the
Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
123-134 (1983); see also JOHN M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800,
at 359 (1986). Defense counsel in English courts at this time either advised the defendant and
the court on questions of law, or (a bit later) participated along with the defendant in
examining or cross-examining witnesses. Only in 1836 did legislation eliminate the last of
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criminal cases in England, and a substantial number of defense lawyers also
appeared in felony cases.16
Reliance on defense counsel in the United States followed a similar
path: defense attorneys became a routine fixture in criminal proceedings in
tandem with the expanded use of attorneys to prosecute crimes. Early state
constitutions and statutes guaranteed the right to counsel, thus repudiating
the legal bar on defense counsel in felony cases that still existed in a
weakened form in England.17 But in the daily practice of criminal law in
state courts in the early national period, defense lawyers were not often
present.18 The same could be said of professional prosecutors, and even
professional judges (the most expensive legal resources available in
American states with relatively few lawyers). State and local governments
did appoint public prosecutors,19 but used them sparingly, for only the most
serious criminal matters. Victims and complaining witnesses, occasionally
represented by private attorneys, prosecuted the case in “summary” criminal
proceedings; the defendant personally cross-examined the witnesses and
presented evidence; and a justice of the peace or magistrate (typically
without legal training) presided.20
During the early nineteenth century, prosecutors became more
influential as they transformed from court functionaries into elected officials
with their own local constituencies. As prosecutors gained influence, the
range of criminal cases they handled expanded and most criminal
proceedings became affairs run by professionals.21 Where the prosecutor
the restrictions on the participation of counsel, and allow the attorney to address the jury in
summary arguments. 6 & 7 Geo. 4, c. 114 (1836).
16
See John M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in
the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 226-230 (1991).
17
See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 14 (1776) (“in all prosecutions for criminal
offences, every man hath a right … to be allowed counsel”); PA. CHARTER, art. 5 (1701) (“all
Criminals shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their Prosecutors”)
(emphasis added); N.J. CONST., art. 16 (1776) (same); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61-65
(1932) (collecting sources). See generally JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 9-21 (2002).
18
See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW
YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1664-1776 at xxv (1944).
19
See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
PROSECUTION 7 (1931) (Wickersham Commission, Report No. 4); PAUL M. MCCAIN, THE
COUNTY COURT IN NORTH CAROLINA BEFORE 1750, at 18, 33 (1954).
20
See ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 48-49 (1930); Eben Moglen,
Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1105-11 (1994).
21
See JOAN JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 19-36 (1982).
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appeared, the defense attorney also became a familiar figure. Defendants
more commonly invoked their constitutional and statutory rights to rely on
counsel in criminal prosecutions.22
The linkage between prosecution and defense functions so evident in
the origins of the adversarial system remained present as the current system
of indigent defense in this country took shape in the middle decades of the
twentieth century. Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court during this period set
the contours of the current system of publicly-financed criminal defense. In
most of its pivotal rulings interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, the Court explicitly invoked the need for a defendant to match the
skill of a professional prosecuting attorney. For instance, in Johnson v.
Zerbst,23 holding that the federal government had to appoint counsel for any
indigent felony defendant in the federal system, Justice Black made this
comparison between prosecution and defense: “the average defendant does
not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before
a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is
presented by experienced and learned counsel.”24
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court said that “reason and reflection” led
to this obvious truth about practical need for defense counsel:
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money
to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to
prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public’s interest in
an orderly society. … That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries.25

As a result of rulings such as Gideon, legislation expanding the
availability of defense counsel, and an upsurge of arrests and prosecutions in
the late 1960s, the judiciary and legal profession found it necessary to
reshape the entire system for providing defense lawyers to indigent
22

See James D. Rice, The Criminal Trial Before and After the Lawyers: Authority, Law, and
Culture in Maryland Jury Trials 1681-1837, 45 AM. J. LEG. HISTORY 455, 457 (1996) (table
showing increase in proportion of represented felony defendants from 27.5% in 1767 to
92.1% in 1825); Chester L. Mirsky, The Political Economy and Indigent Defense: New York
City, 1917-1998, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 891.
23
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
24
304 U.S. at 462-63.
25
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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defendants. The system shifted from discretionary appointments of
practicing lawyers to more regularized institutions such as public defender
offices, contract attorneys, and lists of appointed attorneys. During this
conversion to a more reliable (and more expensive) system meant to handle
a larger volume of cases, attorneys explicitly drew parallels between public
funding of defense attorneys and the public funding of prosecutors and other
components of criminal justice. For instance, Whitney North Seymour, head
of the American Bar Association special committee on counsel for the
indigent, said in a 1963 speech that the obligation to provide counsel for the
indigent accused is “as much a part of the public obligation to support [the
criminal justice system] as the provision of courthouses, judges, attendants,
and prosecutors.”26
The 1963 report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Poverty and
the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (the “Allen Report”), which
formed the basis for reorganization of the defense function in the federal
system and in several states, also takes up these themes. Proper funding of
indigent defense is unlike any other “charitable” spending on behalf of the
poor, in part because the government itself initiates the criminal process.
The public has equivalent obligations to fund the defense along with the
other components of the justice system:
The proper performance of the defense function is … as vital to the health of
the system as the performance of the prosecuting and adjudicatory functions. It
follows that insofar as the financial status of the accused impedes vigorous and
proper challenges, it constitutes a threat to the viability of the adversary
system. We believe that the system is imperiled by the large numbers of
accused persons unable to employ counsel or to meet even modest bail
requirements and by the large, but indeterminate, numbers of persons able to
pay some part of the costs of defense, but unable to finance a full and proper
defense.27

The history and rhetoric of the adversarial system point to a general
principle: when the public funds a skilled professional on the prosecution
side, it should also fund a skilled professional on the defense side. Such a
principle might not resonate with those working in a civil law inquisitorial
system, but it speaks clearly to the adversarial tradition of Anglo-American
criminal justice.
26

The speech is quoted in ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 198 (1964).
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 10-11(1963) (Allen Committee).
27
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The history and rhetoric do not resolve neatly into a requirement of
precisely equal funding for prosecution and defense. Perhaps, following
Blackstone’s libertarian principle that it is better to acquit ten guilty men
than to convict one innocent man,28 it might be wise to fund the defense
function more generously than the prosecution. At the same time, a
jurisdiction might spend more for prosecution than for defense, and still
honor the principle that both functions are equally important. A government
purchasing these legal services might get comparable levels of prosecution
and defense for different prices. After all, prosecutors do not perform
exactly the same functions as defense attorneys. We turn now to the
challenges of matching the work of prosecutors with comparable functions
of the defense attorney, with the aim of producing equally reliable and
useful services on the prosecution and defense sides.

II. RESOURCE PARITY IN CURRENT PRACTICE
The equal importance to society of prosecution and defense may get
recognition in judicial opinions and in historical accounts of the adversarial
process, but the idea gets neglected in today’s legislatures. Legislative
debates usually create no rhetorical linkage between defense funding and
prosecution funding. When legislatures consider possible changes to the
organization or funding of criminal defense, they normally talk about ways
to bring spending down, rather than asking how it compares to prosecution
spending. It is common to hear legislators ask for ways to “contain the
costs” of criminal defense alone, rather than criminal justice as a whole.29
When we move from rhetoric to results, it becomes even more clear
that parity between prosecution and defense is not the operating principle for
28
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (1769) (“the law
holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer”).
29
See Ala. Code § 15-12-21 (1999) (codifying Ala. Acts 99-427, raising attorney
compensation in all categories); John Caher, Court of Appeals Reviews Staffing in Capital
Cases; Fees for Additional Attorneys and Paralegals Challenges, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, Mar.
11, 2002 (speculating that governor’s threat to withhold payments from defense attorneys
was intended to control costs).
Even when actual funding increases become realistic, legislators usually discuss the
step as necessary to avoid a “crisis.” See, e.g., Jonathan Lippman & Juanita Bing Newton,
Assigned Counsel Compensation Plan in New York: A Growing Crisis (Jan. 2000); Allan K.
Butcher & Michael K. Moore, Muting Gideon’s Trumpet: The Crisis in Indigent Criminal
Defense in Texas, at http://uta.edu/pols/moore/indigent/last.doc.
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funding in the legislature. By and large, entry-level prosecutors earn higher
salaries than entry-level public defenders. The salary difference persists at
every level of experience; prosecutors earn more from bottom to top of the
seniority scale.30 While there are many talented and even heroic lawyers
who accept the lower salary to become a defender, in the long run defender
organizations find it more difficult than prosecutors to retain experienced
attorneys at a lower salary.
Sometimes, prosecutors also fare better than full-time state-funded
defense attorneys when it comes to workload.31 Thus, even if defense
attorney positions paid the same salary as prosecutor positions (and
therefore attracted comparable legal talent over the long haul), the difference
in caseload in some jurisdictions would still mean that there is no parity of
funding, on average, for each case.
Finally, prosecutors have greater access to investigators and experts
than the typical publicly-funded defense attorney. Putting aside the police
resources necessary to build a case file to present to the prosecution, the
government often devotes further resources to a follow-up investigation to
strengthen the case in ways identified by the prosecutor’s reading of the file.
And prosecutors turn to expert assistance and testimony relating to scientific
evidence and claims of insanity or mental disability much more often than
the defense.32 Each of these components – salary, workload, and support
services – combine to produce an overall gap in spending between the
prosecution and defense functions.33

A. Salary Parity
The easiest form of resource parity to defend is salary parity. It is also
the form of parity that has made the greatest impact on current practice, and
offers the best hope that a parity standard can take root and survive.
The “standards” that professional groups have developed to identify the
best practices in structuring and running indigent defense programs
30

See John B. Arango, Defense Services for the Poor, 10 SUM. CRIM. JUST. 37 (1995).
See Spangenberg Group, Tennessee Public Defender Case-Weighting Study: Final Draft
Report (April 1999) (under contract with the National Center for State Courts).
32
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure
Entitlements, Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms, 61 OHIO STATE L.J. 801, 828-31
(2000).
33
See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief
Public Defender, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 199, 202-203 (1999).
31
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explicitly call for parity of salary between prosecutors and defenders. For
instance, the ABA Standards on Providing Defense Services say that
attorneys and staff in defender offices should be paid at a rate “comparable
to that provided for their counterparts in prosecutorial offices.”34 On a
rhetorical level, parity between prosecution and defense funding does get
mentioned in some legislative debates.35
More striking than the rhetoric, however, is legislation passed in some
jurisdictions that embodies some form of salary parity. A Connecticut
statute, passed in 1974, provides that “The salaries paid to public defenders,
assistant public defenders and deputy assistant public defenders in the
superior court shall be comparable to those paid to state’s attorneys,
assistant state’s attorneys and deputy assistant state’s attorneys in the
various judicial districts in the court.”36
Although statutes that explicitly require parity of salary are unusual, as
a matter of practice there are examples scattered around the country. The
most visible example comes from the federal system, where federal public
defenders are paid on the same scale as Assistant United States Attorneys.37
Parity of salary is also the practice in Kansas, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Some local jurisdictions also offer
salary parity, such as Orange County, California and Maricopa County,
34
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 5-4.1 (1993); see also
NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE SERVICES, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 3.2 (1974) (salaries for all staff should “in no
event be less than” salaries for comparable positions in prosecutor’s office); NATIONAL
LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ASSIGNED
COUNSEL SYSTEMS (compensation for assigned counsel should be paid commensurate with
other contracted work, such as work contracted by Attorney General); cf. NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, Standard 13.7, 13.11
(1973) (chief public defender to be paid at rate comparable to presiding judge of trial court;
assistant defenders in first five years of service to be paid comparably to associates in local
law firm).
35
See Spangenberg Group, Illinois Task Force Proposes Increased State Funding for
Indigent Defense, 6 SPANGENBERG REPORT, Issue 3 at 5 (Feb. 2001) (proposes that state fund
two thirds of full-time chief defender’s salary if local government sets salary at 90% or more
of local prosecutor’s salary); Margaret Graham Tebo, Promise Still Unfulfilled, 89 ABA
JOURNAL 68 (April 2003) (ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants,
chair Jonathan Ross says that hearings will “shed light on the lack of parity between the
resources available to the state versus those available to the defense”).
36
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-293(h). The original statute applied as well to defenders in the
court of common pleas, but was amended in 1976 to cover only defenders in superior court.
37
See Scott Wallace, Parity: The Failsafe Standard, in 1 COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS 16 (Dec. 2000).
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Arizona.38 Nationwide, recent surveys indicate that salary parity is the norm
rather than the exception for larger public defender offices.39
Salary parity is easier to achieve than other forms of resource parity.
Salaries are relatively easy to equalize because they present no measurement
problems: salaries for all government attorneys depend heavily on years of
experience, so it is easy to identify the relevant comparison points for
prosecutors and defenders. An attorney with three years’ experience in the
district attorney’s office compares naturally to an attorney with three years’
experience in a public defender’s office.40
In reality, attorneys with comparable years logged in the two types of
offices might develop different skills, and their organizations might value
them differently. For instance, if the public defender’s office experiences a
higher turnover rate among attorneys than the local prosecutor’s office, one
might argue for increasing the pay scale more quickly in the PD’s office.
But years of experience, although an imperfect measure of value, remains a
valuable estimate of the salary that government agencies pay their attorneys.
If a government endorses the equal social value of the prosecution and
defense functions, it is difficult not to embrace a form of salary parity. It is
not so clear, however, which institution of government will adopt the
principle. Court system administrators (typically employees of the judicial
branch) often adopt these salary parity policies, but the state legislatures
provide the funding and the general authorizing legislation.41 The
government can also address the question indirectly when attorneys for the
38

Spangenberg Group, Kentucky’s Department of Public Advocacy Continues to Meet
Program Improvement Goals, 6 SPANGENBERG REPORT, Issue 3, at 13 (Feb. 2001)
(Connecticut; Massachusetts; North Carolina; Orange County, California; Los Angeles
County, California; Maricopa County, Arizona; Wyoming); Spangenberg Group, 1999 State
Legislative Scorecard: Developments Affecting Indigent Defense, 5 SPANGENBERG REPORT,
Issue 3, at 1,5 (Oct. 1999) (Kansas); Spangenberg Group, Comparable Pay for Comparable
Work: Making the Case for Salary Parity Between Public Defenders and Prosecutors, 5
SPANGENBERG REPORT, Issue 1, at 6-8 (Mar. 1999) (New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas,
Connecticut, California, Wyoming, Arizona, Tennessee, federal system); cf. Ariz. Stat. §11582 (public defenders to earn at least 70% of salary of prosecutors).
39
See Wallace, supra note 37, at 16 (discusses NLADA survey).
40
Setting the proper compensation rate for appointed counsel is more difficult; it requires
some method of converting a prosecutor’s annual salary into either an hourly rate or a percase fee. The rate for appointed counsel would also have to include some estimate of the
“overhead” costs that prosecutors devote to cases in the relevant category.
41
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH
EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE (2000) (discussing parity in New Mexico and
Connecticut).
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prosecution and the defense belong to the same association or union and
negotiate their salaries in a single contract.42 In this setting, the legislature
funds salary parity as a question of labor relations rather than a direct
statement about the relative value of the prosecution and defense functions.

B. Caseload and Support Services Parity
The next steps toward resource parity go beyond parity of salary; these
next steps, while more difficult politically and technically, are necessary if
the functional equality of prosecution and defense is to become reality. If
each attorney in a defender’s office earns a salary comparable to that of a
prosecuting attorney, but each defender carries a dramatically heavier
caseload, the equality of salary among the attorneys will mean little to the
criminal defendant. The defender will still have less time to spend on the
case and the prosecution will enjoy a systematic advantage. Similarly, if the
prosecutor can rely on investigators and other experts to strengthen the case
while the well-paid public defender has no access to support services, there
is no meaningful parity.
Those who work for improved quality in criminal defense work
recognize the need for this broader form of equality between prosecution
and defense. Aspirational standards such as the ABA Standards call for
equal access to support services43 and rough comparability of workload.44

42

See Wallace, supra note 37.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 5-6.1 (1993) (discussing “supporting services necessary to
an adequate defense”); Allen Report, supra note 27, at 39-40 (discussing need for pretrial
investigation and expert witnesses).
44
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-1.3(e) at 126 (1993) (defense counsel “should not carry
a workload that, by reason of its excessive size, interferes with the rendering of quality
representation, endangers the client’s interest in the speedy disposition of charges, or may
lead to the breach of professional obligations”); id. at Standard 5-5.3, at 67; NATIONAL LEGAL
AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES §§5.1, 5.3, at 411, 413 (1976) (“every defender system should establish maximum
caseloads for individual attorneys in the system” and caseloads should reflect national
standards and consider objective statistical data); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON COURTS 186
(1973) (caseload should not exceed 150 felonies per year; 400 misdemeanors; 200 juvenile
cases; 200 Mental Health Act cases; or 25 appeals).
43
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The gloomy reports that assess indigent defense periodically mention
equalized caseloads and support services as part of the solution.45
But an agreement in principle that individual prosecutors and full-time
defenders deserve equivalent caseloads and support services leaves many
difficult questions unresolved. A legislature cannot simply mandate that
prosecutors and public defender offices employ the same number of
attorneys, because prosecutors and defenders do not work on precisely the
same cases, and do not perform comparable work on each case. Prosecutors
handle many less serious cases where defendants represent themselves.
They also devote time to some cases that they decline to charge, or cases
that they divert from criminal justice before a defense lawyer is assigned to
the case. Prosecutors also staff cases that are defended by private attorneys
or counsel appointed to a case in response to a conflict of interest within the
public defender’s office. Conversely, some public defender offices handle
certain juvenile matters or lesser crimes prosecuted by government attorneys
other than those assigned to the district attorney.46
Even for those cases that assign a full-time government attorney for
both the prosecution and the defense, it is not clear that the two attorneys
should invest equal hours in the case. For some categories of cases, it might
require more hours to assemble witnesses and other evidence to carry the
government’s burden of proof, or the legal research and writing necessary to
respond to defense challenges to the evidence. In other categories of cases, it
may require more hours for the defense attorney to investigate the case and
assemble the legal and factual challenges to the government’s evidence.
Support services are also difficult to equalize. The largest question is
how to account for the work of police officers on a case. Should the police
count as support for the prosecution, whose efforts must be matched by
investigators or other support services for the defense? At the very least,
defense attorneys will insist that they need to match the hours of
investigation that the prosecution performs after the police deliver the case
file. Prosecutors often supplement the investigative file that the police refer
to them, sometimes by directing further efforts by police officers and at
45
See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR F-1 to F-68(1982) ;
SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIM. JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS (1988).
46
When it comes to staff support parity, it would be cumbersome to match each category of
support for prosecution to some comparable position for the defense. Defender organizations
may require a different blend of support services than prosecutors, and need the flexibility to
change the type of support over time. Establishing a very general “staff to attorney ratio” for
the prosecution, and matching that ratio for the defense, might provide rough parity on this
question without delving into too much administrative detail.
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other times through the work of investigators formally assigned to the
prosecutor’s office.47
There might be no clear conceptual solution all these nettlesome
questions. But managers of large prosecution and defender offices are now
developing workable methods of measuring attorney caseloads and support
services, measurements that allow some rough comparisons between
prosecution and defense. Tennessee offers one interesting example of an
effort to measure, compare, and equalize caseloads between prosecution and
defense. Legislators in the state have begun linking growth rates for
prosecution and defense resources.48
Before a 1989 law created a statewide District Public Defenders
Conference, all but two counties in Tennessee depended on appointed
counsel. The legislature set funding levels for the new organization
according to a general formula: public defenders would receive half the
amount of funds devoted to prosecutors.49 Within their first two years of
operation, the new public defender offices demonstrated that funding at this
level was not adequate, so in 1992 the legislature reset the figure, this time
at 75 percent.50 Prosecutors, whose own requests for additional funding were
being ignored while the state money flowed to the new defense offices,
struck back. In 1994, they convinced the legislature to remove the linkage at
the state level between prosecution and defense funds. The amended statute
retained the 75 percent ratio, but applied it only to local government
47
Expert witnesses such as psychiatrists in cases involving an insanity defense, or forensic
laboratory personnel in cases that turn on physical evidence, are more likely to trigger a clear
one-to-one match between prosecution and defense.
48
Sometimes resources will come from sources other than state or local government, such as
private foundation grants. The federal government occasionally funds prosecution but not
defense. See Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-251, 112 Stat. 1871,
Title I (Oct. 9, 1998) (provides 1.25 billion to fund technology for state and local agencies,
including judiciary and prosecution but not defense). While state legislatures might on an ad
hoc basis match some of these prosecution resources through additional appropriations for
the defense, it is more likely that defender organizations will find it necessary to match these
external prosecution funds with their own external fundraising efforts.
49
The amount was based on an estimate of the proportion of cases in the state defended by
public defenders, as opposed to privately retained counsel and appointed counsel. Public
defender offices were expected to handle about half the total cases. Telephone Interview with
Wally Kirby, Executive Director, Tennessee District Attorneys Association (May 5, 2003).
50
In November 1991, the Knox County Public Defender filed a motion asking the General
Sessions court judges to suspend further case appointments because its staff was
overextended. The court responded by notifying the members of the bar that each member
would be expected to take an appointment in a criminal case to reduce the backlog. See
Spangenberg Group, Tennessee Public Defender Case-Weighting Study 2 (1999).
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funding.51 Since virtually all funds for prosecution in Tennessee derives
from the state government rather than local governments, the remaining
statute had limited meaning.
For the next four years, both the prosecutors and public defenders took
their own funding proposals to the legislature; not to be outdone, the
judiciary in Tennessee also made regular requests for more staffing. The
lawmakers turned aside virtually all of these funding requests, and became
convinced that these nominally unconnected funding requests were actually
closely related.52 In 1998, the legislature instructed the prosecutors, the
public defenders, and the judges to conduct three separate “weighted
caseload” studies and to make any requests for new funding in light of the
caseload information.53
The three studies were prepared by contractors under the auspices of
the State comptroller’s office.54 The study of prosecutor caseloads,
completed by the American Prosecutors Research Institute, a research group
affiliated with the National District Attorneys’ Association. The defender
study was performed by the Spangenberg Group, a national consulting firm
dealing with advocates for indigent defense funding, while the National
Center for State Courts completed the study of judicial caseload. For all
three studies, the agency in question collected time sheets and other data on
the typical hours devoted to various common tasks in criminal adjudication,
creating an estimate of the total number of hours (and thus the number of
attorney or judge positions) necessary to complete the cases coming into the
system. The three studies shared common assumptions in tabulating the
number and type of criminal cases that each of the offices would normally
handle.

51

Section 16-2-518 now provides: “From and after July 1, 1992, any increase in local
funding for positions or office expense for the district attorney general shall be accompanied
by an increase in funding of seventy-five percent (75%) of the increase in funding to the
office of the public defender in such district for the purpose of indigent criminal defense.”
The 75 percent figure remains a de facto funding ratio at the state level; budget discussions
treat this ratio as the presumptive outcome, even though it has no statutory basis. See
Telephone Interview with Kirby, supra note 49.
52
See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH
EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS 30 (2000) (NCJ 181344)
[hereinafter, Symposium Report].
53
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-2-513 (1998); Comptroller of Tennessee, FY 2001-2002
Tennessee Weighted Caseload Study Update (2003), available at http://www.comptroller.
state.tn.us/orea/reports/wclsupdate.pdf.
54
See Spangenberg Group, supra note 50.
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When the studies were complete, the prosecutors requested an
additional 126 positions, an increase of 34 percent from the 375 funded
positions at the time. The defenders requested an extra 56 position, a 22
percent increase above their 250 funded positions. Finally, the judicial study
indicated that the state already employed 11 too many judges.
Thus far, the Tennessee legislature has not funded either of the requests
for new attorney staffing.55 Other state spending has taken a priority over
criminal adjudication, particularly in a weak economy. It is clear, however,
that the legislators will not address the budget shortfall by funding new
prosecutor positions without adding comparable positions for the defense.
The moral of this story is not entirely clear. The Tennessee experience
perhaps suggests that parity of resources will not take hold right away; the
results thus far suggest a stalemate rather than routine equal funding of
prosecution and defense. Yet the Tennessee legislature, despite its various
changes in course, did hold to an overarching insight about parity. It
remained convinced over time that there was a connection between
prosecution, defense, and judicial resources for criminal justice, for the sake
of fairness and efficient use of public funds. That insight alone places
criminal defense in a better funding position than when public defense must
convince the legislature that a crisis of constitutional proportions has
arrived.
Defense caseloads and funding might track the overall levels of
prosecution caseloads and funding in places other than Tennessee; indeed,
other states have also begun to explore this territory beyond salary parity. In
Connecticut, the state funding targets for public defense are set at about twothirds the level of funding for the prosecution.56 A New Mexico law links
new public defender staffing to new judicial staffing.57 More generally,
legislatures in many subject areas grow accustomed to hearing the funding
requests of complementary players in a single system, and sometimes
require a coordinated budget request from them.58
55

See Telephone Interview with Kirby, supra note 49. Indeed, budget shortfalls have
required state agencies to cut their budgets in recent years, although the cuts have been
limited so far to support services rather than attorney positions.
56
See Symposium Report, supra note 52, at 16.
57
See Symposium Report, supra note 52, at 16 (Balanced Justice Act); Spangenberg Group,
Vermont, 6 SPANGENBERG REPORT, Issue 3 at 6-7 (Feb. 2000) (Vermont Task Force proposes
reduction in defender workload by requiring corresponding defense budget increases for all
new legislative enactments impacting defender workloads).
58
This is true, for example, when Congress constructs the defense budget for new weapons
systems.
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The fairly widespread acceptance of salary parity, together with the
more tentative experiments with broader resource parity based on caseload
information and coordinated funding requests, suggest that some benefits for
the defense can emerge from the legislature. Yet the various forms of parity
remain the exception rather than the rule; the concept remains more
important in aspirational statements than it is in budgetary practice. Which
institutions and arguments might bring resource parity more into the
mainstream of practices for funding indigent defense? The next part of this
article explores the prospects for achieving resource parity through litigation
in the courts.

III.

RESOURCE PARITY IN THE COURTS

Every year, courts respond to a torrent of traditional ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, detailing in case after case the failings of
individual lawyers. This litigation is especially fertile in the capital
context.59 But these “ineffective assistance” constitutional claims offer no
relief for most defendants, since only the most unthinkable gaffes by
defense attorneys lead to any relief.60 Part of the problem lies in the nature
of the test chosen in Strickland v. Washington61 for measuring ineffective
assistance of counsel, and commentators have diagnosed many different
problems with this standard. The “performance” prong of the test is phrased
generally, without reference to any specific tasks to be performed by
minimally competent lawyers;62 courts have enthusiastically applied the
presumption of competence that the Supreme Court created;63 the prejudice

59

See VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 45 (1994)
(showing ineffective assistance of counsel as most common basis for habeas claims by state
prisoners).
60
See, e.g., People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989) (finding lawyer was not
ineffective even though he consumed large amounts of alcohol on trial days and was arrested
for drunk driving en route to courthouse); Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433 (1999).
61
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
62
See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461
(2003).
63
See Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial
Criminal Process – A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform,
32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743 (1995) (calculating that less than five percent of ineffectiveness
claims have been successful at the circuit court level).
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prong saves many cases despite substandard defense lawyering.64 Indeed,
the very attorney responsible for the poor performance is also responsible
for creating the record on appeal that could demonstrate prejudice.65
The problem goes deeper than the particular formulation of a standard
that the Strickland court chose. Even a prejudice test phrased with a standard
of proof easier for defendants to meet, or a standard without any formally
announced presumption of adequate representation, would still lead to an
overwhelming number of convictions affirmed on appeal. So long as the
constitutional standard requires appellate courts to judge individual cases
retrospectively, these claims will fail overwhelmingly. Any other pattern of
outcomes would conflict with deep-seated traditional beliefs about the
modesty of the judicial role.66
For judges who are convinced that they must declare defense counsel
ineffective only in exceptional cases, the funding available for indigent
defense constrains the standards used to evaluate their work. That is, the
amount of money that legislatures devote to criminal defense will influence
the judicial definition and interpretation of the quality standards. Judges
might be willing to stop the aberrations, to cull the very weakest efforts at
criminal defense. But the judges will also allow the legislature, through
funding choices, to set the average for criminal defense. Judges responding
to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel then apply the minimum
standards in light of that average.
Granted, the causation might on occasion run from the judiciary to the
legislature: constitutional standards could affect the amount that
governments spend on criminal defense. If courts declare that a certain
quality of representation is necessary to obtain a valid criminal conviction,
legislative bodies will spend enough to meet the standard. But our
experience with retrospective standards over many decades, together with
our tradition of a limited judicial role, suggest that causation will ordinarily
run from the legislative funding choices to the judicial interpretation of
quality standards.
The retrospective ineffective assistance of counsel cases, however, do
not exhaust the possible judicial contributions to the quality of defense
attorneys. This Part surveys cases that pursue an alternative strategy,
64

See Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, __ BRANDEIS L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2004) (any retrospective
standard underestimates prejudice due to inevitability cognitive bias).
65
See Dripps, supra note 5, at 245.
66
See Marc Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751 (1999).
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directly addressing the funding for defense counsel. It then analyzes the
current limits of this litigation and suggests how the strategy must evolve
before it can prompt widespread changes in the quality of criminal defense
lawyering.

A. Litigation to Increase Defense Funding
Increasingly over the last twenty years, litigants have questioned the
adequacy of the overall system for compensating the attorneys of indigent
defendants. These challenges take several different forms, generating
challenges to the funding systems both for appointed counsel and public
defenders. With very few exceptions, however, the claims succeed only
when they are confined to the compensation for attorneys in an individual
case. Until recently, courts rejected challenges that extended beyond a
particular case to the systemic funding arrangements for all criminal cases.
Attorneys themselves raised some of the earliest challenges to the
funding arrangements for appointed counsel, arguing that statutory caps on
compensation amounted to an unconstitutional “taking” of the attorney’s
property in a particular case. At first, these claims failed because the courts
reasoned that attorneys carried a professional obligation to represent
indigent defendants without compensation.67 Over time, however, more
courts bowed to the reality that criminal defense work requires specialized
skills, and that the increasing number of defendants requiring appointed
counsel could swamp the qualified attorneys.68 In the cases framing the
67

See Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982) (requiring an attorney to
represent an indigent without compensation is not a taking of property without just
compensation); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965); State v. Ruiz, 602 S.W.
2d 625 (Ark. 1980) (each attorney has taken an oath requiring the performance of services
without compensation if necessary); Sheppard & White v. Jacksonville, 827 So.2d 925
(Fla.2002) (rejects challenge to hourly rate set for appointed counsel in capital cases; inability
to make profit or cover expenses is not sufficient basis for overturning conviction on
constitutional grounds); In re Attorney Fees, 196 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1971) (not
unconstitutional, will continue to work towards increased compensation but not ready to
thrust that burden on the counties yet); Huskey v. State, 743 S.W. 2d 609 (Tenn. 1988).
68
See David Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer’s Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 5
(1980). Some attorneys also framed the challenge as an equal protection claim, pointing out
that the burden of unpaid or underpaid representation falls on some members of the bar but
not others, particularly in states where some local governments rely on appointed counsel and
others use public defenders. See Delisio v. State, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); Arnold v.
Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 1991); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan.
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problem as a threat to attorney property rights, the court offered relief for a
few extreme outlier cases (say, a capital case in which the attorney spent far
more than the caps envisioned for a typical case).69
But when the litigation theory shifted from the rights of appointed
attorneys to the rights of clients to an adequately funded defense, the results
were less happy for defendants. As the emphasis moved toward the rights of
clients, the courts encountered theories that could apply across the board to
many defendants – for instance, the theory that low compensation rates
created a conflict of interest between the attorney and the client.70 Thus, the
courts faced the prospect of raising the funding and quality of appointed
defense counsel generally, rather than correcting a few injustices on the
fringes. Many courts concluded that such a job was overwhelming and not
fit for judges to decide.71
Most often, courts still dispose of defendants’ claims based on
inadequate funding by applying the Strickland standard. They conclude that
the particular defendant could not show “unreasonable” (that is,
aberrational) performance or prejudice, simply because an attorney is

1987); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). Attorneys have also claimed,
unsuccessfully, that unpaid representation amounts to a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s ban on slavery.
69
See United States v. Cheely, 790 F. Supp 901 (D. Alaska, 1992); United States v. Cooper,
746 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Delisio v. State, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987) (taking of
property under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark.
1991) (appointment system violates attorney rights); Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.
2d 1109 (Fla. 1986) (fee caps unconstitutional as applied); White v. Board of County
Commissioners, 537 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1989) (fee caps unconstitutional as applied in capital
case); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987) (striking down appointed
system, reviewing cases from other states); State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214 (N.H. 1983)
(striking down $500 cap on fees); State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966) (conscription of
attorneys an unconstitutional taking of property); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1990) (statutory compensation violates due process, amounts to taking of property);
Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503 (S.C. 1992) (court retains discretion to override caps in
capital cases); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W.Va. 1989); cf. Smith v. State, 394 A.2d
834, 838 (N.H. 1978) (statutory rate caps violate separation of powers, judges must have
power to override caps in individual cases).
70
See State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997) (conflict of interest theory fails); Webb v.
Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 138 (Va. App. 2000) (conflict of interest theory fails); State v.
Bacon, 658 A.2d 54 (Vt. 1995) (conflict of interest theory fails).
71
See Grayson v. State, 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala. 1985) (attorney has an ethical obligation to do a
good job regardless of compensation; systemwide challenge to appointed counsel system
fails); Lewis v. District Court, 555 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1996) (systemwide challenge fails).
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underpaid.72 Lack of funds is too widespread a condition to create a basis for
relief, and defense lawyers regularly prove that an adequate defense is
possible even without much funding. Something more than funding choices
is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate ineffective assistance.
Claims based on inadequate public funding are especially difficult to
win in jurisdictions that use contract attorneys or public defender systems.73
In such systems, the compensation available to the attorney is standardized
and does not vary from case to case. Thus, any conclusions about one case
necessarily has implications for all others. As a result, most of these claims
fail.
A new breeze is blowing in the attorney funding litigation, however. In
a few cases, most decided in the last fifteen years, courts have accepted
claims by defendants and defense attorneys that go to the heart of the
funding systems, claims with implications for entire groups of cases. For
instance, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled in 1984 that the anemic funding
for criminal defense under a contract system created such huge caseloads
that the state was violating the defendants’ constitutional right to counsel.74
A celebrated 1993 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v.
Peart75 held that low funding levels, high caseloads, and inadequate
investigative support all combined to create a “rebuttable presumption” in
every criminal case thatpublic defenders were providing ineffective
72

See Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1990) (relationship between compensation
and effectiveness is not certain otherwise pro bono attorneys are per se ineffective); Pickens
v. State, 783 S.W.2d 341 (Ark. 1990) (attorney was effective, fees reduced to statutory limit);
Coulter v. State, 804 S.W.2d 348, 358 (Ark. 1991) (conflict of interest could be created by
fee cap, but Coulter made no showing of deficient performance or prejudice); People v.
District Court of El Paso County, 761 P.2d 206 (Colo. 1988) (trial court dismissed charges
because attorney claimed fee limit would create ineffective assistance of counsel; finding
must be made after trial, not prospectively); Johnson v. State, 693 N.E.2d 941, 952 (Ind.
1998); Lewis v. State, 555 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1996) (no showing that indigents are harmed);
Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114 (Miss. 1991) (counsel exceeded Strickland standard, no
ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997) (ineffective
assistance claim denied because attorney never requested more money from state).
73
For a description of the difference between these systems and an appointed counsel system,
see Steven Smith & Carol DeFrances, Indigent Defense (1996) (NCJ 158909).
74
State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984) (Sixth Amendment violation under contract
system in Mojave County); Zarabia v. Bradshaw, 912 P.2d 5 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc) (Yuma
County appointment and contract systems are potentially unconstitutional; ruling sparks
creation of public defender system in state); cf. Heath v. State, No. 574 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. App.
2002) (presumption of ineffective assistance for this defendant based on caseload and
inactivity of contract attorney).
75
621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
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assistance of counsel. The Michigan Supreme Court in 1993 struck down a
“fixed-fee schedule” that compensated attorneys with a flat fee for each
case, regardless of whether the case went to trial; such a system gave the
attorney too little compensation for trial work and violated the statutory
right to an attorney who receives “reasonable compensation for the services
performed.” The appellate court ordered the trial court to discontinue the old
system of compensation and to develop a new one.76 And current litigation
in New York made news headlines as a trial judge granted a preliminary
injunction increasing the compensation rates for appointed counsel in New
York City.77 Do these recent court decisions signal that the day has arrived
when litigation can bring parity of resources for the defense into mainstream
practice in the United States?

B. Impact of the Litigation
These recent cases are promising developments, and offer an important
supplement to the case-by-case claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
under Strickland. The litigation is spreading, as national organizations such
as the NAACP and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
join a conscious strategy to file these claims as a way to improve the
funding for criminal defense generally.78
The impact is not limited to jurisdictions where courts actually issue
final rulings supporting the claims. A small number of rulings like Peart can
have ripple effects in settlement negotiations all over the country. Litigants
who present a credible threat of obtaining a cataclysmic ruling (particular
those claimants who survive an initial motion to dismiss) can negotiate
favorable settlements with state and local governments, providing in the
consent decree for higher levels of funding for criminal defense. This is
76

Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n v. Wayne County Court, 503 N.W.2d 885 (Mich. 1993) (set
fees for every case, rules struck down). For more recent litigation over the compensation for
appointed attorneys in Wayne County, Michigan, see Shawn D. Lewis, Lawyers Sue Court
for Raise, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 12, 2002.
77
N.Y. County Lawyers Ass’n v. New York, 745 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (preliminary
injunction granted, defense motion to dismiss denied).
78
See John Gibeaut, Defense Warnings, ABA JOURNAL, Dec. 2001 at 35, 37. One example of
such litigation comes from Mississippi. See Van Slyke v. Mississippi, No. 00-0013-GN-D
(Miss. Ch. Ct. Forrest County, filed Jan. 12, 2000); Quitman County v. Mississippi, CIV.
Action No. 99-0126; Adam Liptak, County Says It’s Too Poor to Defend the Poor, N.Y.
TIMES 15 April, 2003.
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exactly what happened recently in litigation that settled in Connecticut79 and
in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania soon after the claimants survived early
motions to dismiss.80
Nevertheless, these judicial rulings become available only in
jurisdictions where the defense lawyers are extremely under-funded and
overworked. The difficulty for litigants in most of these cases is the
comparison pool: the caseload for the public defenders in the home
jurisdiction is compared to recommended caseloads formulated at the
national level, based on mainstream practices.81 The parties argue about
parity among groups of defenders, rather than parity between prosecutors
and defenders.
A judge will not issue an ambitious order that restructures and increases
the funding for criminal defense based only on a showing that local practice
falls short of national standards, even if the gap is quite large. In some
jurisdictions, many public services do not get the funding they need to meet
aspirational national standards, ranging from safety inspectors to police and
fire protection to public health and hospitals. Indeed, the prosecutors in the
same jurisdiction and the judge’s own support staff often do not meet
national aspirational standards.
When a judge knows of less than ideal funding for so many public
services, only the most obvious departures from the recommended caseloads
for defense attorneys can catch a judge’s attention. Only the defenders at the
bottom of the national ladder will appear to merit any relief.82 The need to
point to unusually badly funded systems may explain why so little of this
litigation is filed, despite longstanding and universal complaints about
overall funding for criminal defense.83
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See Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 950545629S, 1996 WL 636475 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23,
1996); Connecticut Div. of Public Defender Services, 1999 Annual Report at 25 (2000)
(settlement adds 54 new positions over 2 years, with 5 million budget increase).
80
See ACLU, Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary Board, No. GD-96- 13606 (Pa. Ct. C.P. filed
Nov. 21, 1997), settlement described at http://www.aclu.org/news/n051398b.html; see also
John B. Arango, Defense Service for the Poor, 13 CRIM. JUST. 25 (1998).
81
Symposium Report, supra note 52, at 2-3; 1 COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEMS (Dec. 2000) (400 misdemeanors or 150 felonies per year).
82
For examples of cases turning aside systemic challenges to public defender systems, see
Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338
(Miss. 1990).
83
See Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, at n.93 (2000) (estimating the filing of ten systemic
challenge cases since 1980).
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The judicial rulings, even the most ambitious of them, have another
limitation, as well: their help is only temporary. After a judge orders or
convinces the state or local government to fund indigent defense at
prevailing rates for the time, the world moves on. Inflation immediately
starts eroding the salaries of the attorneys; greater numbers of arrests and
charges erode the gains in caseload. Over time, the old difficulties for
defense attorneys return, though perhaps not quite in the extreme form that
provoked the earlier judicial ruling.84
One such story of erosion comes from Louisiana. Within the first two
years after the enormous litigation victory in 1993, the state legislature did
increase the annual funding for criminal defense by $5 million. In 1997, the
legislature funded a new statewide oversight board for criminal defense,
appropriating $7.5 million.85 But the additional money was less impressive
over the long run. The amount of the statewide appropriation actually
devoted to New Orleans was modest, because so many parishes took a share
of the state support, meaning that local revenues remained the most
important source of funding for criminal defense.86 The annual appropriation
from the state remained the same every year, meaning that it decreased in
real terms. Because of increases in arrests, charges, and funding for the
prosecution, the funding that litigation brought to indigent defense in New
Orleans must stretch further than before. Today, the caseloads for defenders
in New Orleans remain remarkably heavy, perhaps even heavier than they
were before the Peart litigation.87
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See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992) (setting standard for
modifying injunctive relief or consent decrees).
85
See 1997 La. Acts No. 1361, 1997 HB1 (Indigent Defender Assistance Board, budget item
20-945), codified at La. R.S. 15:151. For the earlier funding difficulties of the Indigent
Defense Board in Orleans Parish, see Susan Finch, $5 Million OK’d to Defend State’s Poor,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 24, 1994, at B4; Carl Redman, House Committee
Halves Indigent Board Budget, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, May 2, 1995, at 4A; Jack
Wardlaw, Legal Defense Fund Cut by Panel, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 2, 1995,
at A3.
86
The base budget for Indigent Defense in New Orleans is over ten million dollars per year.
87
Telephone Interview with Steven Singer, Staff Attorney for the Louisiana Crisis Assistance
Center (May 12, 2003). Louisiana is not alone; the long-term effect of reform litigation has
been disappointing in other locations, as well. For an account of events in Arizona after the
Smith decision in 1984, see John A. Stookey & Larry A. Hammond, Arizona’s Crisis in
Indigent Capital Representation, 34 ARIZONA ATTORNEY at 16 (March, 1998); John A.
Stookey & Larry A. Hammond, Rethinking Arizona’s System of Indigent Representation, 33
ARIZONA ATTORNEY 28 (Oct. 1996).
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C. Changing the Point of Comparison
Imagine the difference that a parity principle could make for each of
these shortcomings in the systemic litigation. Instead of comparing the
defense resources available in one jurisdiction to the defense resources
available elsewhere, the court would ask how the defenders’ resources and
caseloads compare to the resources and caseload of the local prosecutors.
With this the relevant comparison point, relief might go to a larger group of
defenders. When the resource norms are set by prosecutors rather than a
larger pool of defenders, a Lake Wobegon effect becomes possible in
reverse: all defenders can be well below average.88
A principle of parity between defense and prosecution can also address
the fleeting quality of litigation success. If a judicial order requires new
resources for the defense every time the prosecution receives new funding,
the benefits to the victors in the litigation stay constant. Economic inflation
or increases in arrests or charges should affect the prosecution and the
defense roughly equally. If the prosecutors remain under funded during lean
budget years, the negative impact of poor funding for the defense will not be
so severe.89
Yet it is precisely these features of the parity principle that could make
judges reluctant to embrace it. Courts traditionally shy away from remedies
that dictate to the legislature a method of addressing a legal violation.90 The
Louisiana Supreme Court in Peart declined to give the legislature any
benchmarks for the proper level of spending to remove the constitutional
violation.91 An Oklahoma court used prosecutor salaries as benchmarks for
88
The reference, of course, is to Garrison Keillor’s mythical town, where all the children are
well above average. GARRISON KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGONE DAYS (1985).
89
In particular cases, a poorly funded prosecutors’ office might spell bad news for
defendants, because the prosecutors will screen out fewer sloppy cases and leave more work
for overextended defense lawyers. But when prosecutors cannot devote proper attention to
each case, the errors in the file are likely to become more obvious and should not require
much additional investment from defense counsel to uncover.
90
See generally STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE
VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1995); James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School
Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432 (1999).
91
See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 790-91 (La. 1993) (placing limits on remedy ordered by
trial judge); id. at 792-96 (dissenting opinions, noting lack of specificity in court’s remedy);
New York County Lawyers’ Association v. State, 745 N.Y.S.2d 376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002)
(refusing to grant injunction requiring state to review number of hours billed by appointed
lawyers and enforce guidelines for appointed counsel).

28

Law Review

[Vol. 100: 1

setting defense attorney salaries, but only on an interim basis. The
legislation responding to the problem increased the rates, but made no longterm commitment to parity.92
While a parity principle might be less specific (and thus more tolerable
to the courts) than an order naming a particular dollar figure for an annual
budget, it nonetheless could force some major shifts in public funding. Any
judicial order to enforce parity would also remain in effect over a long time
period, and it would generate regular disputes about which prosecutorial
advantages require some matching benefit to the defense. Courts would
rather avoid this sort of sustained and detailed monitoring of a remedy.93

IV.

RESOURCE PARITY AND PUBLIC CHOICE
THEORY

The short history of defense funding litigation, together with the
institutional limits of courts, suggest that litigation alone will not bring the
parity principle into common usage. Why not, then, ask the legislature
directly to adopt the principle of equal resources for prosecution and
defense? This possibility has received only the most cursory and dismissive
attention, for several reasons. For one thing, close attention to the legislative
branch is a blind spot for legal scholarship, not just in the criminal justice
context but in most other fields. Legal scholars from the common law
tradition mostly view legal problems from the vantage point of courts; if an
issue does not appear on the docket of the U.S. Supreme Court, it does not
resonate in the legal academy.94
Another reason why the legislative prospects for defense funding get so
little attention is a sense of futility. Discussions of defense funding often
refer in passing to legislatures, but conclude fatalistically that legislatures
are no friends of criminal defendants.95 As Attorney General Robert
92

See State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). For the legislative reaction in
Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§1355-1370 (creating Oklahoma Indigent Defense
System Board).
93
Cf. Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1157
(2000) (discussing challenges of ongoing judicial monitoring of remedies).
94
For one attempt to remedy this problem in the Criminal Procedure classroom, see MARC L.
MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2003).
95
See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 92 (1999) (“Achieving solutions to this problem through the political
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Kennedy once put it, “The poor man charged with crime has no lobby.”96 In
this view, the legislature will fund legal counsel for criminal defendants
only when the constitution and the courts require it.
This observation has some basis both in experience and in theory. It is
easy to find examples of legislatures that refuse to increase (or even to
maintain) funding for criminal defense work, and legislators are none too
subtle in explaining that the defense of accused criminals is a low funding
priority.97
Public choice theory also contributes to this hopelessness. This model
for explaining legislative behavior might predict low spending on criminal
defense: legislators interested in their own political careers will see that
those who could benefit from government-funded defense lawyers –
convicted criminals, accused criminals, and those likely to be accused of
crimes – probably cannot help them get re-elected. This segment of society,
poor and alienated, probably does not and cannot contribute much to
election campaigns. The beneficiaries do not publicize or endorse the
legislator’s work on behalf of a large bloc of voters. In short, because there
is nothing to benefit the legislator’s political career when voting for stronger
criminal defense funding or for linking it to prosecutorial funding, it will not
likely happen.98
Such pessimism about legislatures in criminal justice, however, is
overstated. The facts on the ground tell us that legislatures sometimes vote
for things that benefit the defense, even when the courts interpreting the
constitution do not demand them. For instance, states have long provided
defense counsel in a broader range of cases than the Constitution strictly
requires.99 Given the minimal levels of competence required to satisfy the
process is a pipe dream”); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not
for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1870 (1994); Dripps,
supra note 5; Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2066-68 (2000); Robert R. Rigg, The Constitution,
Compensation, and Competence: A Case Study, 27 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 3 (1999) (Iowa case
study).
96
Kennedy is quoted in Lewis, supra note 26, at 211.
97
Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What The Courts Can Do To Improve The Delivery Of
Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 293, at nn. 96-98 (2002) (recounts futile
efforts to get legislation in New York); Marcia Coyle, Republicans Take Aim at Death Row
Lawyers, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 18, 1995, at A1; Mandy Welch, Death Penalty Chaos Calls for
Systemic Change, TEX. LAW., Dec. 13, 1993.
98
See generally, MORRIS FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989).
99
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); VT. STAT. tit. 13, §§5231, 5201.
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Sixth Amendment and due process guarantee of effective counsel, one must
conclude that most states fund their systems at levels higher than the bare
minimum that the constitution would tolerate.

A. Prosecutors and Bar Groups as Entrepreneurs
A closer look at public choice theory suggests that criminal justice
legislation actually falls into several distinct categories, each with different
implications for the theory. For us to appreciate the differences among these
categories, it is necessary to review the way public choice theory tracks the
distribution of costs and benefits that new laws create.100
The costs of a law might be dispersed broadly among the public, or
they might fall more heavily on a smaller group. Similarly, the benefits of a
law might be concentrated on a small group, or the benefits might be more
diffuse and go to the public at large. Different combinations of these
situations lead to different predictions about the legislative process: if both
the benefits and costs are concentrated on groups that feel the effects and
can organize to make their views and influence felt, the legislature will find
it difficult to pass laws in this zero-sum situation where a gain for one group
is keenly felt as a loss for some other influential group, and stalemate will
often result.101 If both the costs and benefits of the law spread lightly among
large groups, the legislature is likely to act only when some event (or some
person or group) brings this issue to the attention of the public that could
benefit.102
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See generally, MICHAEL HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL
MARKETS (1981); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); JAMES
WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973).
101
An example of this situation is labor legislation, where the costs and benefits land on welldeveloped groups on both sides, representing both employees and employers.
102
Two other combinations are also possible. In situations where a new law would create
widespread costs (think of taxpayers) and concentrated benefits (think of tobacco farmers
hoping for subsidies), the legislature is quite likely to act. The benefiting group will devote its
organized resources to support legislators who vote for the program, while the disorganized
public will pay so little individually that they will probably exact no political price.
Finally, in situations where a new law creates concentrated costs and widespread
benefits (think of environmental regulation), the legislature is not likely to act unless some
entrepreneur brings the issue to the attention of the public. Even then, the legislators will be
inclined to pass vague legislation that endorses the benefit (clean air) without specifying the
cost (the amount of pollutants to remove from the air or the type of equipment required).
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Criminal justice legislation fall into this second category: both the costs
and the benefits of these laws fall broadly on the public (although it is also
true that some segments of society feel these costs and benefits more acutely
than others). The social benefits of criminal justice laws include public
safety, cultural solidarity, and all the other virtues that are said to serve as
the “purposes” of the criminal law.103 The widely-shared costs include the
funds necessary to operate police departments, criminal courts, prisons, and
other corrections programs. These costs include the privacy and liberties that
all must sacrifice to some extent for effective law enforcement.
Political scientist Douglas Arnold examined the reasons that legislators
might respond to the “inattentive public” rather than devoting all their
energies to special interest legislation.104 He identified several conditions
that could awaken the inattentive public on a particular issue, allowing the
legislator to benefit by supporting new laws on that subject. One of the key
conditions Arnold identified was the presence of a “policy entrepreneur”
who powerfully and repeatedly brings the issue to the attention of the public.
The entrepreneur might be motivated by a principled commitment, or
because she will benefit above and beyond the benefits that flow to the
public, or by both types of reasons.
In the criminal justice realm, the prosecutor is the most important
policy entrepreneur, and this becomes most obvious in debates over the
coverage of the substantive criminal law. When a prosecutor promotes a
new criminal law expanding the reach of the code, no organized or effective
opposition is likely to appear to point out any costs of the expansion. In this
setting where the costs of new legislation are inchoate, as William Stuntz
has noted, the criminal law is bound to expand, regardless of the merits of
the arguments: “Prosecutors are better off when criminal law is broad than
when it is narrow. Legislators are better off when prosecutors are better off.
The potential for alliance is strong, and obvious.”105
103

For some of the classic explanations of these purposes, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 169 (1968) (deterrence);
Shlomo Shinnar & Reuel Shinnar, The Effects of the Criminal Justice System on the Control
of Crime: A Quantitative Approach, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 581 (1975) (incapacitation);
Joseph Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000) (social cohesion).
104
R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990).
105
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510
(2001). It is also not surprising that the legislature often adopts symbolic legislation to add to
the criminal code, because a non-attentive public is not likely to insist on crime legislation
that is used effectively and extensively. See John Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic
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The situation is different when it comes to changes in the criminal
punishment statutes. Here, prosecutors regularly request increases in
authorized punishment ranges and oppose any decreases in the ranges, but
entrepreneurs sometimes appear on the scene to point out the costs, as well.
State corrections officials who operate prisons and other programs, along
with local government officials who operate jails, remind the legislators that
increased use of punishment resources is costly.106 With some frequency, the
legislature makes the connection between the costs and the benefits, and acts
with restraint on new punishment legislation.107
Changes to the criminal adjudication process, such as the funding
scheme for defense attorneys, fall into a third category, where prosecutors
are even less likely to sway the legislative debate. In this setting, policy
entrepreneurs step forward to point out the benefits of better funding and
more reliable results.
Convicted and accused criminals are not alone in wanting to see decent
levels of funding for criminal defense counsel, and some of the groups with
opinions on these questions can be very helpful during election campaigns.
The legal community generally favors such spending: the American Bar
Association periodically opines about the importance of adequate funding.108
The affinity of lawyers for public spending on legal services might be easy
to explain to cynical terms, but it also speaks to some of the deepest
aspirations of the profession.109 Some specialists in criminal justice also tend
to favor additional spending for criminal defense. Judges, for instance, know
that when defense counsel become involved effectively in more cases, their
sentencing options increase along with their confidence in the outcomes.110
Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990); Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It?
The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non- legal Factors Influencing the
Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997).
106
The reminder could also come from educators and others who compete with corrections
for a limited state or local budget. See Marc Miller, Cells vs. Cops vs. Classrooms, in THE
CRIME CONUNDRUM 127 (Lawrence M. Friedman and George Fisher, eds., 1997).
107
See Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980-2000, 29
CRIME & JUSTICE 39 (2002). In Arnold’s terms, the costs of more severe criminal sanctions,
though spread broadly among the public, becomes more noticeable because the voter can
trace the costs of prison to at least some changes in the sentencing laws, and the magnitude of
that cost is sometimes large enough to be noticeable. Arnold, supra note 104.
108
See the ABA policies discussed supra in part II.
109
Note that many loan repayment assistance programs cover both prosecutors and defense
attorneys within the qualifying definition of “public interest” lawyering. Some federal
educational loans, however, are available only to prosecutors.
110
See, e.g., Judith Kaye, State of the Judiciary, 2003.
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Even more critical than the presence of entrepreneurs on the “benefit”
side of funding debates is the altered role of prosecutors on the other side.
Prosecutors in some jurisdictions might actually favor increased funding for
defense attorneys to promote the reliability and predictability of the criminal
process.111 Even if prosecutors oppose parity of salary or resources for
defense counsel, they may appear self-interested and lose some credibility
with the legislators.
Thus, the configuration of policy entrepreneurs who can awaken the
inattentive public to the costs and benefits of criminal justice legislation will
look quite different in these three settings. The prospects for new laws that
incidentally benefit criminal defendants are best when dealing with the
quality of the adjudication process, an issue that attracts attention from the
organized bar and other motivated and influential groups.

B. Reframing the Issue
Funding for defense counsel has another advantage over other criminal
justice issues, in addition to the favorable alignment of interested parties.
The public has mixed views on the issues involved, and the parties (and
legislators) have several options in how to frame the issue when explaining
votes to the public.
Many voters favor, at least in the abstract, the notion that litigants
should have some rough equality of resources, simply as a matter of fair
play and taking proper precautions during weighty decisions.112 They also
favor abstract principles of equal pay for comparable work. Some
legislators, particularly those with legal training, may be even more
sympathetic to procedural fairness than their constituents. They appreciate
that the integrity of an adversarial system like criminal justice depends on
adequate resources for both sides.113
111

For instance, during the current litigation over funding for appointed attorneys in New
York City, Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morganthau has remained pointedly (and
supportively) silent.
112
Spangenberg Group, Kentucky, 5 SPANGENBERG REPORT (2001) (Kentucky survey).
113
Legislators themselves may have conflicting views on these funding questions, and
deliberation on the question may help them clarify those views. To put the point in the
vocabulary of those who criticize the public choice model, the debate may create endogenous
shifts in preferences; we should not assume that the legislator’s views are static and
exogenous to the process. See DONALD GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY (1994).
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In this setting where lawyers and judges favor a specific funding
decision, and voters have conflicting views about the question, strange
things can happen. A predictive rule of thumb along the lines of “criminal
defendants always lose” will prove to be too crude. Legislators in such a
setting might look for ways to reframe (or to obscure) the defense counsel
funding question at higher levels of abstraction thatmight appeal to the
voters. If the budget decisions become associated with these public ideals
about competitive balance and equity among employees, the public choice
account that focuses on benefits for powerless criminal defendants does not
capture the reality.
Legislatures develop strategies in many areas to reframe issues at a
different level of abstraction – think of the use of sentencing commissions
around the country over the last two decades.114 The legislation creating
sentencing commissions speaks generally (and often incoherently) about the
goals of criminal punishments. The laws also instruct the commission to
consider the state’s available resources and tell judges to place particular
weight on certain recurring facts when they sentence individual defendants.
The final products that the legislatures adopt contain some unpopular
outcomes, such as limits on the use of prison for some lesser felony
offenses.115 But legislatures adopt them in the name of larger principles,
such as “truth in sentencing” or “rational allocation” of corrections
resources.116
In a related technique, legislators who try to build momentum for
unpopular but necessary measures might link a set of unpopular choices to
another related and more popular set of choices. For instance, at the federal
level, members of Congress link any salary increases for themselves (highly
unpopular) to salary increases for judges (relatively uncontroversial). In the
114

See generally MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996).
See David Boerner, 28 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH (Michael Tonry, ed.
2001).
116
Another example of this phenomenon involves the federal law in the 1990s that required
Congress to vote up-or-down on an entire package of military base closings. Congress passed
this law knowing that the abstract concept of fewer bases was sound, but equally aware that
each member would hope to spare the base in his or her home district. Efforts to amend the
specific entries on the closing list often unraveled the entire package. Similarly, we could
view a pay parity statute as a technique for changing the level of abstraction in the debate.
Few legislators will vote for ad hoc budget increases to give accused criminals a more
vigorous and effective defense. More legislators – particularly those with legal training and
sympathy for ideas of fair play in litigation – might vote for spending enough, in principle, on
criminal defense to have confidence in the quality of the convictions that our system
produces.
115
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same vein, state and local legislators might link unpopular spending
increases for indigent defense to the more popular increases in resources for
prosecutors.117
Finally, consider how the commonplace legislative practice of
delegating authority to administrative agencies allows the legislature to
control the relevant level of abstraction for its debates. In many areas of
regulation, the legislature passes a statute endorsing a popular and abstract
principle (say, “safety” or “clean air”) and leaves the unpopular and more
concrete details to an administrative agency (say, the amount the public
must pay for cars that burn less gasoline).118 Similarly, in the area of
criminal defense services, state legislators can endorse general principles of
fairness and respect for individual liberties, and deliver such general
instructions to local governments, while making them responsible for the
“details” of funding and organization of defense counsel.
Under the right conditions, then, legislators pass laws that produce
unpopular applications of shared public ideals. It happens when these laws
attract more attention from the small group of supporters than from the
larger group of opponents; it happens when the debate becomes framed in
terms of a popular (or tolerable) abstract principle rather than an unpopular
practical tradeoff. The potential exists for legislators to do the same when it
comes to funding criminal defense attorneys for the indigent.

V. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SYNERGY
Resource parity for indigent criminal defense is more than a foolish
hope in the legislature; on the other hand, it is no sure thing. The conditions
have to be favorable before this unlikely result comes out of the legislature.
At the same time, the institutional habits of courts make it unlikely that
judges will order full-blown resource parity on a regular and ongoing basis.
Where neither the judiciary nor the legislature is likely to complete the job
acting alone, they could reinforce one another because a very small number
of litigation successes anywhere in the country can improve the legislative
environment. The threat of litigation can move funding issues to the center
of legislative attention, and create a presumption against the status quo.
117

Alternatively, the salaries of both prosecutors and defense attorneys could be set as some
fixed percentage of the salary paid to judges who preside in criminal proceedings.
118
See Peter Aronson, Ernest Gellhorn, & Glen Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982).
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Modest courtroom victories on the issue of prison conditions played a
similar reinforcing role in the legislature.119 Shocking conditions and severe
overcrowding at prisons around the country did produce some judicial
rulings stating that the conditions violated the Eighth Amendment bar on
cruel and unusual punishment.120 A few of the opinions were bold and
eloquent, and raised the prospect of major litigation and judicial rulings all
over the country. In this environment, legislatures acted (and spent)
decisively in many states to improve prison operation and to relieve the
overcrowding through a combination of expanding prisons and releasing
inmates.
In retrospect, it is surprising that legislatures reacted as strongly as they
did to the prison conditions litigation. In many states, the existing prison
conditions were not so horrifying as the Arkansas and Alabama work camps
that produced the most sensational judicial rulings.121 There was plenty of
room for states to litigate the question of just how extreme the overcrowding
must become to qualify as a constitutional violation; it remained unclear
exactly what a state would have to spend to satisfy a judicial ruling. In some
states, officials fought every step of the way. But in others, the legislature
took the lead in reshaping the state prisons after litigation (or merely the
threat of litigation) put the issue into play. In North Carolina, for example,
state officials entered settlement negotiations fairly early in the litigation,
and passed a “prison population cap” statute that seemed to go beyond the
minimal changes that a judicial order probably would have required. The
litigation also inspired a series of changes to the sentencing laws that
improved the state’s ability to control prison admissions and plan for future
correctional resources as needed.122
The reasons why legislators in some places passed laws that provided
more resources to prisons than judicial rulings would have ordered are
difficult to reconstruct. Perhaps the legislators handicapped the litigation
risks poorly, as parties in litigation often do. It is also possible that
legislators were genuinely troubled by prison conditions, and the litigation
created an occasion to change the prisons while blaming the federal courts
for the costs.
119

Dripps, supra note 5, at n. 182, makes the prison analogy.
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The threat of litigation might operate in a similar way for indigent
defense counsel systems. Legislators, some because of legal training and
others because of experience with labor relations and personnel
management, will respond with sympathy to the idea that defense attorneys
and prosecutors deserve equal treatment. The judges who create the
litigation risk will be state judges rather than federal,123 but the legislators
might still treat the risk of a court ruling as the necessary political cover for
reshaping the counsel system.
Conditions that favor parity of resources are likely to develop slowly.
For this reason, supporters of criminal defense funding should move
incrementally, starting with easier issues such as salary parity. In
jurisdictions that rely entirely on appointed counsel, linking the
compensation for defense work to prosecution salaries will address a large
part of the overall resource balance. Appointed attorneys, accepting one case
at a time, are better able than full-time public defenders to manage caseload.
We might discover over time that judges become more involved in
some forms of parity than others. For instance, salary parity seems a more
prototypical legislative issue involving relations among state employees.
Parity of access to expert witnesses, on the other hand, might become more
of a judicial specialty, an application of Sixth Amendment principles
announced in Ake v. Oklahoma.124
Attorneys working on capital cases might be an attractive starting point
for introducing the concept of salary parity. There is some risk involved
here, since these cases attract such close attention and strong emotions;
legislators may question the merits of funding these cases above the bare
constitutional minimum. Indeed, legislators have defunded centers that
provide training and coordination for capital defense.125 Yet there is a
powerful need for reliable process in capital cases that will be scrutinized so
carefully on appeal, and resource equity can improve the chances for a
reliable outcome at trial. Legislators who vote for defense funding in the
capital context routinely point out these advantages to the voters. Several
jurisdictions, including Mississippi, already provide salary parity for defense
attorneys in the capital context.126 Capital litigation resource centers also
123
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provide the sort of investigative and expert support services that are
available only rarely for other criminal matters. Although the politics here
are volatile, it appears that defense in capital cases has already become a
testing ground for the parity principle, in several of its forms.

CONCLUSION
Parity shows particular promise when compared to other more directive
“command and control” strategies to regulate a complex art like defense
lawyering. Quality standards are possible to formulate, but it is virtually
impossible to measure, for an entire system, how close the defense attorneys
come to fulfilling their obligations under the standards.127 How much of a
departure from the ideal to tolerate will vary from place to place, depending
on the quality of public services that citizens typically accept.
Parity regulates more indirectly, asking only about the strength of
certain defense resources, without specifying how attorneys should use
those resources. Resource parity for the defense can reduce to a few
manageable indicators the whole complex of opportunities and judgments
that cannot directly be measured or regulated.128
In the arena of indigent criminal defense, nothing can add value faster
than money. While public choice theory cautions us about the difficulties
involved, it is not a foregone conclusion how any given legislative debate on
defense funding will end. On this issue, public ideals about competitive
balance might interfere with simple anti-defendant crime politics. Given the
known limits of litigation for improving criminal defense in the forty years
since Gideon,129 we should treat the unknowns of the legislative process as
reasons to hope and study.
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